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SELF-REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
SAM SCOTT MILLER*

INTRODUCTION

While self-regulation has played an influential role in the governance of
financial markets for some time,' government officials and other commentators have advanced assorted new self-regulatory schemes in the last few
* Michigan State University, B.A. (1960); Tulane Law School, L.L.B. (1964); Yale Law
School, L.L.M. (1965); Vice President and General Counsel, Paine Webber Group Inc.
1. Self-regulation of the securities markets is carried out by industry-sponsored groups
called self-regulatory organizations (SROs) under the oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Ten national securities exchanges, one national securities association, ten
registered clearing agencies and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) are currently
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). The exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the NASD), the only registered national
securities association, provide and regulate market facilities; promulgate rules governing the
conduct of their members; inspect and monitor compliance of those members; and discipline
members for violations. Clearing agencies furnish participants with comparison, clearance and
settlement services. The MSRB issues rules governing transactions in municipal securities, but,
unlike the NASD and the stock exchanges, has no authority to enforce its rules through
disciplinary proceedings or otherwise. The SEC and the bank regulators are responsible for
enforcement of the MSRB's rules.
For a general description of self-regulation in the securities markets, see SECURITIES AND
ExcH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MAcRETS, H. Doc. No. 95, pt. 4,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. 692-728 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the SPECIAL STUDY]. The Special Study
observed, "There are, no doubt, many other instances in which the policy of entrusting a degree
of social control to 'private' groups has been adopted, but securities regulation is unique in
featuring self-regulation as an essential and officially sanctioned part of the regulatory pattern."
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 501; see also Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities
Business, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 518 (1952), in which the authors state: "In a manner
thus far unique in our economic life, the securities business has evolved social controls through
private agencies which are drastic and extensive."
This pattern has influenced regulation of the commodities markets. The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), pursuant to section 17 of the Commodity Exchange Act, has
registered the National Futures Association (NFA) as a self-regulatory organization. Modeled
after the NASD, the NFA establishes rules relating to fair and equitable trading and is assuming
certain regulatory functions of the CFTC, such as registration, fitness requirements, dispute
resolution procedures and the like. Membership in the NFA is compulsory for all CFTC
registrants, except floor brokers.
The NFA's development has been subject to intense negotiations within the industry and
the government. The NFA seeks better cost control over regulatory expenses by eliminating
inefficient overlap and conflict among self-regulatory programs. In addition, the NFA contemplates more effective policing by the industry itself of those segments operating outside the
exchanges' present standards and surveillance. The NFA's organizing committee decided early
on that membership should be compulsory for those who do business with the public and
obtained legislative agreement in 1978. See infra note 127.
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years, ostensibly as alternatives to direct governmental regulation. 2 These
schemes include self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to govern investment
advisers and investment companies, commodity futures merchants, small
business investment companies, government securities dealers and financial
planners, as well as to assist in processing exemptions from the prohibitedtransaction rules under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.3
In addition to the SROs in the securities and commodities industries, the Federal Communications Commission proposed to establish an SRO, the Exchange Carriers Association, to
assume responsibility for tariff filings and allocation of telephone revenues after the American
Telephone and Telegraph divestiture. Self-regulation is also important to some professions, such
as accounting and law.
Self-regulation sometimes takes forms other than associations. For example, self-certification is used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (automotive manufacturers'
safety compliance), the Coast Guard (small vessels' lighting requirements) and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (voluntary monitors of safety standards). Other types of selfregulation include the use of independent auditors, such as independent public accountants as
auditors of financial statements, independent directors to prevent abuses of investment company
shareholders, the Coast Guard's reliance on third-party inspections of pressurized containers,
and the employment of parental reviews of day care centers by the Department of Health and
Human Services. The term self-regulation also is used sometimes (although not in this article)
to describe the mechanisms of the market.
2. See infra note 3; Remarks of SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr., to the
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Conference on Broker-Dealer Regulation
(Jan. 12, 1984) (noting trend towards shifting governmental functions to private sector).
3. Examining the issue of regulation, the SEC has considered self-regulation by mutual
funds and their underwriters and investment advisers. See Investment Co. Act Rel. No. 13044
(Feb. 23, 1983); see also Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244, 247
(1963). Similarly, the CFTC is seeking to transfer regulatory functions to the NFA. Chairman
Susan M. Phillips has said,
the only way that we can.., support the industry growth is by increased reliance on
self-regulation. We are working with the exchanges to assume more and we're also
looking to NFA to take on more of our direct regulatory functions. Now all I think
that's going to mean is that we will be able to reassess and reallocate our resources
internally so that we can keep up with the industry growth.... Now from what I
can tell in working with the leaders of the self-regulatory organizations, both the
exchanges and NFA, they are having to swallow pretty hard and pick up some of the
things that they relied on us to do in the past.
CFTC Chairman PredictsGrowth, Sees Challenge in InternationalMarkets, 16 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 169, 177 (1984); see also The Government Securities Acts Amendments of 1980, S.
2515 (bill that, inter alia, would have applied self-regulatory scheme to brokers and dealers in
certain government-guaranteed securities); Request for Comments on the Oversight of the U.S.
Government and Agency Securities Markets, Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21959 (April 19,
1985); Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CapitalAdequacy Guidelinesfor U.S. Government
Securities Dealers (1985); Department of Labor, Participationof Self-Regulatory Organizations
in the Prohibited Transaction Exemption Process-Solicitationof Comments, 49 Fed. Reg.
48111 (Dec. 10, 1984); SPEc AL STUDY, supra note I, pt. 4, at 692 (self-regulation should be
extended to other areas of securities business); Television Network Program Procurement
Comm., Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1963)
(self-regulation proposed for broadcast industry); The Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1966, Hearings Before Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 45-55, 161-66, 174-78, 184-89 (1966) (self-regulation for small business investment companies). But see Address by SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox Before the Investment
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Lawmakers and regulators also have suggested that existing SROs take on
additional tasks, such as the government securities markets and administering
4
margin rules.
Given this renewed interest, it is appropriate to revisit the myth of selfregulation and offer a critical analysis. This analysis will concentrate on the
securities markets, where self-regulation has been most pervasive.
An examination of self-regulation reveals that through the self-regulatory
device both the regulators and the regulated seek different objectives. (Perhaps it is the vagueness of the concept and its chameleon aspects that account
for its mutual attraction). For regulators and their legislative overseers, the
concept is attractive from a budgetary standpoint.5 Activities that would
otherwise have to be paid for by a governmental agency are carried out by
a separate, industry-financed entity. In addition, regulators may concentrate
efforts on their priorities and eliminate more prosaic functions.6 At the same
time, government aims at substituting a regulatory scheme as efficacious as
that which it would provide directly.
Regulated industries, on the other hand, generally view self-regulation
as more flexible and cheaper than direct governmental regulation. They see
Adviser Operations and Regulation Conference, The Commission and the Regulation of
FinancialPlanners: Assuming the Appropriate Role 11 (Oct. 29, 1984).
The United Kingdom has evinced interest in using self-regulation in its financial markets.
The Government's White Paper setting forth a new system of regulation for the financial
services industry contemplates that powers of authorization of investment businesses and of
their regulation will be delegated to self-regulatory bodies. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1985) [hereinafter cited as the U.K. WHITE
PAPER].

4. See The Public Securities Act of 1985, H.R. 2032, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REc. 1955, 1957-59 (expanding authority of Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board to include
dealers in government and government agency securities); 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 123
(1985) (Federal Reserve Board recommends SRO authority over margin requirements).
5. See Address by Barbara S. Thomas before the CSI/Institute of Chartered Accountants
Conference (Oct. 25, 1983). From the perspective of an SEC Commissioner, Ms. Thomas
described self-regulation as fulfilling:
a service which would be extraordinarily cumbersome for our federal government to
perform. Currently, some 9,000 public companies are registered with the SEC, and
perhaps twice that number of broker-dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, and other securities industry participants are subject to our jurisdiction. Our
direct responsibilities for registration, reporting, legal interpretation, enforcement and
oversight are considerable. If they were coupled with direct responsibility for the
matters primarily administered by the self-regulatory organizations, we would face a
herculean task. At our present staffing levels, we simply could not do it all. Thus,
self-regulation has permitted the SEC to focus on major issues and generally to avoid
many of the detailed regulatory responsibilities for the securities industry. In fact, in
the face of our government's current movement towards deregulation, the selfregulatory organizations are even more critical and must now assume more responsibility towards ensuring the integrity of their members and of the market place.
6. See supra note 5; see also Background Paper on Self-Regulation v. Government
Regulation of Financial Institutions, SEC Conf. on Major Issues Confronting the Nation's

Financial Institutions and Markets in the 1980s, at 6, (Oct. 6-8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as the
SEC Self-Regulation Paper].
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less rigidity in a process more within their control and, concomitantly,
carried out by those who better understand the industry's dynamics. 7 The
regulated industry, moreover, wants insulation from direct governmental
8
involvement.
SROs are also business enterprises and competitors. This dichotomy of
functions is illustrated by an interview of John J. Phelan, Jr., chairman of
the New York Stock Exchange. Mr. Phelan first described the traditional
responsibilities of the exchange:
We're a quasi-public institution, and we have a broad responsibility
to the general public, the individual investor, the institutions, the
listed companies, the member firms and the membership, as well.
We have an obligation to oversee the marketplace, to see that the
fairness we talk about is carried out. For member firms, we have a
responsibility to oversee their financial viability and their operational
viability and to see that they have sales practices that are consistent
with good reputable practices. I also think we have an educational
role, getting people to understand the process of a market and how
the capital markets work. 9
Mr. Phelan devoted the bulk of his comments, however, to the exchange as
a competitor for new listings and new products. Mr. Phelan predicts that
this competition will cause the exchange to become "far more of a marketing
organization and far more aggressive on the sales side....1 0 This article
will explore the ramifications of these competitive activities on SROs' regulatory roles."
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Report of Special Study of
the Securities Markets (Special Study) conducted in the early 1960s concluded
"that the basic statutory design of a substantial reliance on industry selfregulation appears to have stood the test of time and to have worked
effectively in most areas."' 2 I will address in this article whether that
7. See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 664-65 (1964).
8. An exception is made, of course, to the extent required to sanction price fixing. See
B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME 6 (1978); cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 268 (2d ed. 1977); Miller, Regulation of Trading in Ginnie Maes, 21 DuQ. L.
REV. 39, 92-93 (1982).

9. Views of the Big Board's New Leader, The New York Times, May 25, 1984, at D-I,
D-13.
10. Id.
11. For an interesting case study of SRO competition in which regulatory schemes have
been used as counters by the exchanges against the NASD in opposing an expansive designation
procedure for National Market System (NMS) securities, see SEC File No. S7-787, Securities
Exch. Act Rel. No. 20902 (May 7, 1984).
12. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note I, pt. 4, at 504; accord, SEC Self-Regulation Paper,
supra note 6, at 6;

SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY-REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES,

HousING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
137 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY].
COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
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assessment is currently justified. In any event the Special Study's additional
conclusion that "self-regulation presents its own problems of practicality
and efficiency, not unlike those of direct governmental regulation,"' 3 leaves
open whether direct governmental regulation-or simply relying on the
common-law system of privately enforced rights' 4-might be more effective
in some instances. Moreover, if self-regulation works as well as its proponents
claim, one must wonder why the device has not been utilized in other
financial sectors, such as the depository and insurance industries.
This examination of self-regulation has been influenced by the efficiency
view of regulation that looks for the balance when "it is theoretically
impossible to make someone better-off (in economic terms) without making
someone else worse-off."' 6 Originated by Pareto in the Nineteenth Century,
this theory provides an objective standard for deciding when and in what
form regulation is needed.' 7 Regulation is desirable only when the free market
fails to achieve optimum allocative efficiency.' 8 I do not propose to apply
the efficiency theory as a rigid standard, however, recognizing that the
designers of the self-regulatory framework of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 were also concerned with equity and market abuses, concepts difficult
to incorporate into the theory.
In considering the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce gave a more qualified endorsement:
the [self-regulatory] system has, on occasion, been found seriously deficient and it
has not operated as effectively or as fairly as the public interest would require.
Nonetheless, in the last Congress, the Committee found that the system, as a whole,
has worked and recommended that it be preserved and strengthened.
H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 48-49 (1975); see also II L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1389-91 (1961).

13. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note I, pt. 4, at 722.
14. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 271. Posner points out that the "concept of 'market
failure' must be balanced by one of 'government failure'." But cf. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 34-46 (1938).

15. Cf. Westwood & Howard, supra note 1, at 543-44. Increased involvement by depository institutions in securities activities has elicited a proposal by the NASD to extend its
jurisdiction over persons who solicit or receive orders from public customers for the purchase
or sale of securities or give investment advice or recommendations to such customers respecting
securities transactions and are employed by non-broker-dealers who receive compensation in
respect of such transactions from NASD members. NASD Notice to Members 83-72 (Dec. 20,
1983). The proposal has created considerable controversy in banking circles. See Zigas, Regulatory ProposalSparks Debate, American Banker, Jan. 20, 1984, at 3.
16. Edwards, The Regulation of Futures Markets: A Conceptual Framework, Columbia
Business School Working Paper Series # CSFM-23, at 9. See, e.g., TASK GROUP ON REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 41-42 (1984).
17. Thus "the effectiveness of self-regulation must be compared to the alternatives: no
regulation or government regulation." TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SER iCES,
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 44 (1984). But see R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 10-12.
18. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 8-19. This is not to say that regulatory objectives may
not relate to market efficiency. For instance, measures aimed primarily at consumer protection
may also improve market efficiency by informing market decisions and increasing market
activity. At the same time, we must keep in mind that regulation invokes cost and that
incremental cost discourages use of markets, thus impairing allocative efficiency. Id. at 36-38.
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THE MYTH oF SELF-REGULATION

William 0. Douglas provided the classic justification for self-regulation:
Self-regulation .

.

. can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning

influence over business practices and business morality. By and large,
government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That
leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it
susceptible of government regulation but in fact too minute for
satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery of the

law in the realm of ethics and morality. Into these larger areas selfgovernment, and self-government alone, can effectively reach. 9
Self-government can reach into "minute" areas of conduct as well as the
realm of ethics and morality, because, it is contended, the expertise of
industry participants can be deployed more efficiently and SROs are more
responsive than "remote" government agencies. 20 In addition, removing
direct regulation may eliminate tensions between government agencies and
2
regulated industries. '

19. Address by William 0. Douglas before the Bond Club of Hartford (Jan. 7, 1938).
One commentator has suggested that Douglas' promotion of self-regulation under governmental
oversight was inconsistent with his "Brandeis-like enthusiasm for economic and governmental
deconcentration." J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 158 (1982).
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963), Mr. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the minority, set forth the purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Exchange
Act: "to delegate governmental powers to working institutions which would undertake, at their
own initiative, to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal standards in a complex and
changing industry." See SPEciAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 694 and 722; SENATE INDUSTRY
STUDY, supra note 12, at 13, 149; II L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1361-62; Cary, supra note 3.
20. See SPEcIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 693 and 722; see also Hearingson H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 514 (1934) (discussing regulatory goals of Exchange Act). In testimony addressing the
limitations of governmental regulation in the context of the future Exchange Act, John
Dickinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, stated that:
In framing a regulatory measure, the practical problem of administration has always
to be faced and when regulation gets beyond a certain point the sheer ineffectiveness
of attempting to exercise it through government on a wide scale counter-balances the
fact that possibly the exchanges might not be as diligent as the Government would
be if the task were compact enough to fall within the limits of effective government
performance.
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1934); see also U.K. WIHrE PAPER, supra note 3, at 13;
H.R. RE. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (market changes and greater volume have
increased responsibilities of self-regulatory organizations); SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note
12, at 149.
Commentators also viewed SROs as a more flexible mechanism for dealing with rapidly
changing, dynamic industries. Report to the Secretary of Commerce of the Comm. on Stock
Exchange Regulations, S. Res. No. 84, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) [hereinafter cited as the
Roper Report].
21. Jennings, supra note 7, at 678.
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Self-regulation has deeper benefits,
because participation by the regulated in the regulatory process tends
not only to make regulation more palatable but also, by making the
participants more aware of the goals of regulation and of their own
stake in it, to make them individually more likely to discipline
themselves and to render "voluntary" obedience. 2
Indeed, the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance asserts "the
phrase 'self-regulation' must be consigned to the past. 'Cooperative regulation'
best describes the common task of protecting investors and the public
as "a
interest. ' 23 Similarly, an SEC Commissioner describes self-regulation
24
shared, cooperative system of industry and federal regulation."
22. See

SPECIAL STUDY,

supra note 3, at 6, 13;

supra note 1, pt. 4, at 694 and 722; see also U.K.

SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY,

WHITE PAPER,

supra note 12, at 149. According to an SEC

Commissioner,
The SROs also play an important educational function in the supervision process.
These functions will need to be augmented for the future. As problems develop that
are not limited to one or two firms, the SROs should assist in developing sound
solutions and then should give widespread currency to those solutions, perhaps
through circulars sent to the membership. They need to become a clearinghouse for
better ideas, a library to house guild standards, as they evolve.
Remarks of Bevis Longstreth to the Fifteenth Annual Rocky Mountain State-Federal-Provincial
Cooperative Securities Conference (Oct. 29, 1982). Cf. Foster, Codification in Post-Mao China,
30 A. J. Comip. L. 395, 396 (1982) (characteristic communist method of law enforcement is
innovative informal system emphasizing popular involvement and reeducation).

23.

ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
92d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT OF SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY 85 (Subcomm.
Print 1972); cf. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 502; II L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1362;
W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 64 (1940). The Senate Industry Study expressed concern
SUBCOMM.

FOREIGN COMMERCE,

about the term "self-regulation," because it might "lead to the impression that the industry
and government fulfill the same function in the regulatory framework or that they enjoy the
same order of authority or deserve the same degree of deference, whether by firms, courts or
Congress." SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 147.
24. Record of Proceedings, SEC Conf. on Major Issues Confronting the Nation's Financial Institutions and Markets in the 1980s, at 13 (Oct. 6-8, 1982). The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) also has adopted the terminology of cooperative regulation:
Implicit in the concept is a common awareness that all participants in the securities
industry regulatory process-firms, self-regulatory organizations and government
regulators-all share the same essential goals of assuming high standards of protection
and service to investors.
NYSE 1983 Annual Report 14. The Comptroller General asserted a more realistic-and
restrained-foundation:
Industry regulation and Government regulation are not alternative, but complementary, components of the regulatory process. The relationships between self-regulatory
organizations and the Commission are sometimes referred to as "partnerships" or
"cooperative" regulatory systems. Although such references attempt to clarify selfregulatory relationships, they are nonetheless misleading unless tempered with the
knowledge that industry and Government under self-regulation do not have the same
regulatory perspective, responsibilities or powers.
Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, Securities and Exchange Commission
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Proponents of the myth include some concerned about the "increasing
burdens of government" and its unwieldy processes, "who look with hope
2
to the assumption by non-state agencies of a portion of social control."
Those who hold this view seem to assume that control by non-governmental
agencies is, as such, preferable to that of a governmental agency. 26 The
alternative of dispensing with both means of control is rarely considered.
II.

CONCERNS

This review of the myth of self-regulation leads to a discussion of its
criticisms. Paradoxically, SROs are charged with providing insulation from
more effective governmental regulation 27 as well as with a tendency to
overregulate. 21 Related to the latter charge, self-regulation has been criticized
as more expensive than direct regulation and a means for submerging the
costs of government programs.Y Some commentators fear that the absence
of the checks and balances of government permit the abuse of rights of
individuals and business entities. 30 Others express concern about the anticompetitive aspects of self-regulation.' As this article addresses these conShould Strengthen Its Inspection Oversight of the National Association of Securities Dealers 45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Report by the Comptroller General].
25. Westwood & Howard, supra note 1, at 518.
26. See United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330 (1978); U.K. WHITE PAPER, supra
note 3, at 13; cf. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and When? A
Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U.C.D. L. REv.
527, 544 n. 73 (1983).
27. See SEC Self-Regulation Paper, supra note 6, at 6; see also SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 1, pt. 4, at 695; SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 145; cf. Report by the
Comptroller General, supra note 24, at 7.
28. Cf. Edwards, supra note 16, at 37. The Senate Industry Study also posed questions:
about the present allocation of self-regulatory responsibility among the various
exchanges and the NASD. That allocation, which represents historical rather than
functional patterns, results in overlapping and duplicative regulation and different
standards of conduct for firms engaged in the same lines of activity.... [T]he time
has come to begin planning the framework which will guide the developments of the
self-regulatory system in the future. In the revised system, a single nationwide entity
would be responsible for regulation of the retail end of the securities business,
including such matters as financial responsibility and selling practices, while each
exchange would concentrate on regulating the use of its own trading facilities.
SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 15, 16.
29. See Jennings, supra note 7, at 677; see also Remarks of Philip F. Johnson Before
Third Annual Commodities Law Institute, 573 SEc. RE. L. RaP. (BNA) E-1, 2 (Oct. 8, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson Remarks]; cf. SEC Self-Regulation Paper, supra note 6, at 8.
30, See SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 14, 17; Lowenfels, A Lack of Fair
Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and
the NASD, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1979).
31. See B. OWEN & R. BROUTmAm, supra note 8, at 6; Miller, supra note 8, at 98-99
and nn, 252-53; SEC Self-Regulation Paper, supra note 6, at 6; SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra
note 12, at 2, 3, 19, 145, 157-64; Hearings on Securities Industry Study Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.,
pt. 3, at 76 (1972).
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cerns, I shall compare self-regulation to direct government regulation. At
the same time it is important to remember that direct government regulation
raises the same concerns. 32 Thus we should ask whether no regulation (other
than that provided by privately enforced rights) might be a preferable
alternative in some cases.
A.

Insulation

From the outset of governmental involvement in self-regulation, critics
of self-regulation have expressed concern that SROs might not be sufficiently
dedicated to their regulatory tasks.3 3 The Special Study found this concern
warranted, 34 recognizing that,
No business is eager for regulation ,,, and it is only natural to
expect less zeal for almost any aspect of the job on the part of a
self-regulator than may be true of an outsider whose own business
is not involved .... To the extent that these are matters of degree
the self-regulator, absent governmental oversight, is generally and
understandably motivated by self-interest to lean toward the lesser
3
degree. 1
Congress and the SEC may have acquiesced in the assumption of
regulatory powers by the SRO for motives that facilitated insulation. One
commentator has observed that "Congress granted to the SEC broad discretionary powers to cope with problems that the lawmakers found too delicate
or taxing to handle directly, The SEC, no more anxious than Congress to
confront these problems, shifted many of them to self-regulatory organiza6
tio n s . . ..,3
If self-regulation does tend to insulate an industry group from effective
regulation, an illusory facade of protection is presented to the affected
public.17 For instance, the Securities Industry Study Report of the Subcommittee on Securities, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(Senate Industry Study) found that the SEC had abdicated standards of

32. See, e.g., Urban &Mancke, Federal Regulation of Whiskey Labeling: From the Repeal
of Prohibition to the Present, 15 J. LAw & ECON. 411 (1972); Jordan, ProducerProtection,
Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. LAWv & EcON. 151
(1972).
33. See Hearingson H.R. 7852 and HR, 8720 Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1934) (discussing limitations of governmental
regulation in context of Exchange Act).
34. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 695 and 722. In addition to the built-in
reluctance to address some problems, SROs on occasion may actively oppose regulatory
initiatives by the SEC. See J. SELiaMAN, supra note 19, at 189.
35. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt, 4, at 695.
36. Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. Rav. 755, 756 (1984).
37. See Blumrosen, Six Conditions for Meaningful Self-Regulation, 69 A.B.A.J. 1264

(1983).
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financial responsibility and specialist performance to the SROs despite dis38
satisfaction with how the SROs had administered these standards.
Proponents of self-regulation stress that industry expertise is mobilized
by SROs, resulting in a more knowing, less clumsy method of regulation. 3 9
Not much attention has been given, however, to how this industry expertise
is conscripted. Indeed, one might wonder how SROs avoid "the slowness,
the ponderousness, the routine, the complication of procedures, and the
maladapted responses of 'bureaucratic' organizations to the needs which they
should satisfy and the frustrations which their members, clients or subjects
consequently endure.'"'1
SROs generally do not appear to have any greater access to industry
expertise than their governmental counterparts. The industry committees or
panels of volunteers that are held out as serving this purpose in fact have
very little capability to assume unfamiliar regulatory tasks. The Special Study
recognized the "compromise with the ideal of self-regulation by industry
members-and the special advantages attributed to it-in the direction of
' 4
full-time paid staffs. '
The Special Study also questioned whether a regulated industry would
make the commitment of time and personnel necessary to accomplish effective self-regulation:
To the extent that emphasis is placed on "self," i.e., members of
an industry actually regulating themselves, self-regulation depends
on the efforts of part-time volunteers who can be expected to sacrifice
38. See SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 178; see also SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE
AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS-REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65, 101
(1971); H. BARUCH, WALL STREET SECURITY RISK ch. 10 (1971); J. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at
450-66; Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 257, 259 (1984).
39. See, e.g., Westwood & Howard, supra note 1, at 529.
40. M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 3 (1964). Crozier also describes several
positive reasons for the existence of bureaucracies: "A main rational of bureaucratic development is the elimination of power relationships and personal dependencies-to administer things
instead of governing men. The ideal of bureaucracy is a world where people are bound by
impersonal rules and not by personal influence and arbitrary command." Id. at 107.
41. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 696. Even if the ideal existed, the Special
Study identified a further drawback of parochialism:
Securities regulation entails the adjustment and accommodation of different and
sometimes competing aims and policies. The considerations involved frequently
transcend the confines of a particular market or market institution, or even of the
entire securities business, requiring that more general interest and policies be taken
into account. But a group of exchange members or over-the-counter dealers regulating
their own market, even assuming the greatest of zeal, may have no awareness of, or
may ignore or even flaunt, these wider concerns of public interest.

Id.; cf. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 627, 628 (1939).
A former SEC chairman and professed admirer of self-regulation acknowledges that "as
the scope of self-regulation enlarges, it will become increasingly arduous without an effective
staff." See Cary, supra note 3, at 245; see also SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 602.
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only a limited amount of their time and energy otherwise available
for private pursuits .... Thus the balance between the roles of parttime volunteers and full-time paid staffs presents problems of theo-

retical and practical adjustment as the nature and scope of
self4 2
regulatory responsibility is altered by changing circumstances.

Those industry personnel who do contribute their expertise to regulatory
processes might also be enlisted by governmental agencies.
B.

Overregulation

Like other institutions, SROs promote their service. Because of sensitivity
to criticism from their overseers and a tendency to anticipate that criticism,
SROs in some instances may be more active than optimal efficiency would
dictate. 43 Moreover, as Louis Jaffe reflected, "[t]he nostrum most approved
by an administrator for the ills of a regulated industry is more regulation;
to him it seems as obvious as to the doctors of another era that the remedy
for unsuccessful bleeding is more bleeding." ' 44 Administrators of SROs
are
45
as prone to this remedy as their counterparts at government agencies.

46
The Exchange Act gives SROs a broad grant of regulatory authority.

42. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 503.
43. Edwards, supra note 16, at 37-38. Cf. TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCL
SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 37-38 (1984); Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the
Profession:A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. LAW & EcON. 421 (1975).
44. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HAgv. L. REV. 319, 322
(1964).
45. In a proposal to adopt rule 476A, providing for the imposition of fines for minor
violations of Exchange rules, the NYSE acknowledged that, "currently, when the Exchange
discovers a technical, inadvertent or otherwise clearly minor Exchange rule violation, its only
practical response may be to issue a verbal or written caution to the person or persons calling
attention to the need to comply fully with all requirements of all applicable Exchange rules and
warning against future violations." Failing to explain why this approach is inadequate, the
NYSE merely has asserted the existence of a "regulatory need." File No. SR-NYSE-84-27;
Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21327, 49 Fed. Reg. 37201 (1984).
46. Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, which was adopted as part of the 1975
Amendments, requires each SRO to enforce compliance by its members and associatedpersons
with the Exchange Act and rules adopted thereunder (including SRO rules). Associated persons
(defined in §3(a)(21)) include a corporate parent or affiliates, regardless of whether they are
engaged in securities activities or where their activities are carried out. Qualifications to this
obligation include (a) Exchange Act §17(d), which contemplates that the SEC will avoid
duplication and foster coordination among SROs (see rules 17d-I and 17d-2 thereunder); (b)
Exchange Act §19(g)(1), which incorporates the rule of reason in qualifying the obligation to
enforce compliance with the phrase "absent reasonable justification or excuse"; and (c)
Exchange Act §19(g)(2) which authorizes the SEC to relieve an SRO of obligations to enforce
compliance by members or classes of associated persons. Rule 19g2-1, adopted thereunder,
establishes three classes of persons: (i) securities persons, (ii) controlling persons, and (iii) all
others. Depending on the classification of an associated person, the rule relieves an SRO from
the obligation to enforce compliance. Non-securities subsidiaries of a member's parent generally
will not be of interest to an SRO. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 12994 (Nov. 18, 1976) (10
SEC Docket 998); see also NYSE rule 304 and Information Memo 81-8 (Feb. 4, 1981) concerning
approved persons.
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Perhaps caused in part by competitive zeal, SROs also evidence an inclination
to expand their areas of regulation.47 Nonetheless, the SROs may be constrained by the growth of multi-service financial conglomerates. Given the
present compartmentalization of financial regulation and the concomitant
purview of the Exchange Act, the stock exchanges and the NASD would
have difficulty regulating, for example, insurance or thrift activities, not to
mention dry-goods or construction. While it might be contended that SROs
are as suitable as government agencies for functional regulation, the absence
of a tradition of self-regulation in the non-securities sectors of financial
markets means that such sectors would have to generate SROs from scratch.
Moreover, the performance of SROs in the securities arena suggests that
self-regulation in non-securities areas may not be such a wise course.
C. Cost of Self-Regulation
If SROs are overregulating, it follows that such regulation is more
expensive than it should be. Although this is equally true of overzealous
government regulators, it is, nonetheless, possible that the dynamics of selfregulation lend themselves to compounding costs. Government regulators
may view SROs as an off-balance sheet means of leveraging the overall
regulatory scheme, and SRO officials may be enthusiastic accomplices.
In promoting the idea of an SRO for investment companies, an SEC
Commissioner stated:
The rapid growth and change in the industry have greatly increased
the Commission's workload. On top of the continuing projects which
the Commission has undertaken, including its comprehensive review
of the regulatory and disclosure requirements applicable to investment companies, have come greatly increased filings and a host of
novel regulatory issues. Beyond these burdens, of course, is the
Commission's responsibility for inspections. Here is the nub of the
problem. Despite increasing demands in responsibilities, the Commission's staff resources have been cut back. This problem is likely
to persist for the foreseeable future ....

We are finding it increas-

ingly difficult to respond to the growth and change in the industry
and to maintain a cycle of inspections that assures adequate public
confidence and protection of investors. 48

47. SPECIAL STuDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 502. Over the protest of other SROs, for
example, the NYSE recently changed its member firm regulatory fee structure, stating that:
"[t]he Exchange computes the new fee on member firms' gross revenues. . . a basis that reflects
the over-all nature of a member's business, rather than-as in the past-solely on the basis of
Exchange trades. . . ." NYSE 1983 Annual Report 15. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 20843
(April 9, 1984). But see Exch. Act §§6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6); S. RP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47 (1975).
48. See Remarks by Bevis Longstreth to Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference: Investment Company Self-Regulation-The Time Is Now (March 24, 1982); see also supra
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This "deficiency," the Commissioner asserted, should be supplied by an
SRO. Unfortunately, neither the Commissioner nor the SEC collegially has
addressed the alternative of doing fewer inspections but in a more productive
49
way.
Considering the overall costs of self-regulatory processes, we should be
concerned about congressional authority over independent agencies' budgets.50 If Congress denies authority for a program, and a regulator simply
proceeds with the program, shifting the cost to the industry by means of a
self-regulatory system, the regulator has circumvented the legislative process.
Regulators could thus avoid fiscal accountability." After all, regulation
becomes no less intense or comprehensive by being assigned to an SRO.
Moreover, given the oversight obligation on the part of government, assigning
regulatory burden
an area to a self-regulator might result in a greater overall
2
than if carried out by a government agency directly.1
D. Abuse of Rights
An SRO exercises governmental power in several ways that may adversely
affect the interests of particular persons. The SRO may impose disciplinary
note 5 (comments of former SEC Commissioner Thomas discussing self-regulation).
As suggested in 1978 by Harold Williams, then chairman of the SEC, an SRO for investment
companies would conduct inspections, set business practice standards, enact certain economic
regulations and discipline its members. The later proposal was limited to inspections.
49. In a presentation to the Securities Regulation Institute of the University of California
on January 21, 1983, SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad pointed out that the Commission had
conducted 1,065 investment company and advisor inspections in its 1982 fiscal year, up 26%
from the prior fiscal year and the highest level in recent years. See Remarks of John S.R. Shad
to Securities Regulation Institute of the University of California (Jan. 21, 1983); see also 15
SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 457 (Mar. 11, 1983). SEC Chairman Shad attributed these results in
part to improved management techniques and automation. Mr. Shad asserted that fees received
as a percentage of the SEC budget had increased to 94% in fiscal 1982 (principally due to the
growth of money market funds).
50. The securities industry, and indirectly public investors, bear the costs of self-regulatory
organizations. The SEC, like other government agencies, is funded by the taxpayers, though
various fees charged by the Commission offset a substantial part of the budget. This budgetary
happenstance could be altered legislatively and should not by itself dictate public policy.
51. See Johnson Remarks, supra note 29, at E-1. NASD District Business Conduct
Committees have postponed determination on matters presented to them in order to apply
pressure against defendants to achieve sanctions, such as reimbursement to customers, that are
not within the NASD's direct power.
52. See SPECIAl SrUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4. at 694-95. The Special Study answers the
criticism that self-regulation may be more burdensome than governmental regulation with the
argument that
participation by the regulated in the regulatory process tends not only to make
regulation more palatable but also, by making the participants more aware of the
goals of regulation and of their own stake in it, to make them individually more
likely to discipline themselves and to render 'voluntary' obedience. ...
[Tihose whose concern about conduct has been directed 'beyond the periphery of law
in the realm of ethics and morality' are less likely to give rise to regulatory concern
in the narrow sense. Id.;
see also Jennings, supra note 7, at 677.
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from doing business with
sanctions, deny membership and prohibit members
53
particular non-members or in certain securities.
As the Special Study recognized, SROs do not constitute a homogeneous
membership having identical interests.5 4 Moreover, some industry participants
may be able to dominate an SRO and then create competitive disadvantages
for smaller members or those firms attempting to enter a market.1 Because
of this disparity of interests and the ability to influence the SRO, the Special
Study regarded as "essential that regulatory structures and procedures be
such that the legitimate rights and interests of no affected group are
inaction-producing impasses are promptly and approoverridden and that
' 56
resolved.
priately
The legislative history of self-regulation reflects that part of its appeal
was "nonlegal, quick acting, nonreviewable disciplinary measures [by comparison with] the slower moving processes of an administrative agency or
the courts. '"57 William 0. Douglas characterized industry self-regulation as
able to "act swiftly and more subtly than a government bound by due
process standards .... "158 A critic of these processes charges, however, that
"[a] paucity of procedural guidelines, a lack of adherence to such guidelines
as they exist, an excess of discretionary power vested in staff personnel,
arbitrary decisions, and a generally haphazard approach 59... permeate the
proceedings of the two major exchanges and the NASD."
Of course, the statutory scheme established in 1934 was not altogether
bereft of procedural protections, 60 and Congress subsequently has augmented
53. See SecuritiesActs Amendments of 1975, Report to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as 1975 SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT]; SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 14.
54. See SPEcIA STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 696.

55. Domination may occur because of the larger resources commanded by a particular
group of participants with similar interests or because of political advantages in an SRO's
internal processes. Cf. Order Disapproving Proposed Rule Change SR-CBOE-84-16 and Approving Proposed Rule Change SR-CBOE-84-15, Securities Exch. Act. Rel. No. 22058 (May 21,
1985); Chicago Board Options Exchange Inc., Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21439 (Oct. 31,
1984).
56. See SPEciAl. STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4 at 696; see also Roper Report, supra note 20,
at 10.

57. Roper Report, supra note 20, at 8, 12.
58. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 158. A due process defined by adversary procedures
undoubtedly is an unstated assumption of this advantage. Although beyond the scope of this

article, the theory of "internal" administrative law being developed by Jerry Mashaw in the
context of social welfare programs offers an alternative means of dealing with the time and
cost constraints of the procedural safeguards and appellate review that traditionally have been
intrinsic to our notions of due process. See J. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); Mashaw,
The Management Side of Due Process, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974); Verkuil, The SelfLegitimating Bureaucracy, 93 YALE L. J. 780 (1984).
59. See Lowenfels, supra note 30, at 376; Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963) (illustrating arbitrariness identified by Lowenfels). But see Poser, Reply to Lowenfels,
64 CORNELL L. REv. 402 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Exchange Act §6 (exchanges must submit data concerning rules of procedure
as condition to registration) and Exchange Act §19(b) (SEC authorized to alter or supplement
exchange rules as condition to registration).
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these protections .6 I Nonetheless, the appeal of summary processes to the
drafters of the initial scheme, and the drafters' belief that due process was
too cumbersome an element to fit neatly into the self-regulatory scheme gives
of their members on occasion,
reason to consider the treatment by SROs
62
whether for competitive or other reasons.
E. Impact on Competition
Negative impact on competition may be the most severe drawback of
self-regulation. The Senate Industry Report expressed concern that "exchanges have undertaken to regulate the activities of their members in areas
which essentially require economic determinations rather than decisions as
to whether particular activities are inequitable, manipulative, fraudulent or
deceptive. The decision-making process in these areas has created serious
problems for the self-regulatory system." 63 Formulation by an industry of
standards of business conduct and enforcement of those standards is inherently restrictive of competition.64 As the United Kingdom White Paper
explained, "it is a risk of regulation by practitioner-based organizations that
61. The Maloney Act provided procedural safeguards for members of national securities
associations. Exchange Act §15A; see, e.g., National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 17 S.E.C. 459
(1944). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 subsequently extended these safeguards to
exchange members. Exchange Act §6(b)(6)-(7).
62. Under NYSE rule 476A, for instance, the NYSE may simply impose a fine of up to
$5,000 for "any violation of an Exchange rule which the Exchange determines to be minor in
nature." The NYSE would
serve on the person to be fined a written statement setting forth the rule violated, the
act or omission constituting the violation, the fine imposed, and the date by which
the fine must be paid or the person must contest the matter. The person may pay the
fine, thereby waiving his right to a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 476 and any
review of the matter by a Hearing Panel or the Exchange Board of Directors, or he
may contest the fine by submitting a written answer. If the fine is contested, the
matter becomes a "disciplinary proceeding" before a Hearing Panel under Rule 476.
The Hearing Panel will then determine guilt or innocence and will be free to impose
any disciplinary sanction permitted under Rule 476. In such a case, the Hearing Panel
will also determine whether the rule violation was minor in nature.
Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21327, 49 Fed. Reg. 37201 (1984).
Notwithstanding the exchange's claim of efficiency for this process, the practical working
of such a rule is likely to put the person charged at a disadvantage. The previous requirement
that a hearing panel review settlements provides some protection both for persons charged and
for the integrity of the disciplinary process. The proposed procedure will tip the balance of cost
and risk against those charged with rule violations.
63. SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 15. The Senate Industry Study reported
that some ten years after Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, neither of the principal stock
exchanges had established procedures for providing notice or a hearing for non-members
adversely affected by their actions. Id. at 154; see also infra notes 125-41 and accompanying
text.
64. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 1, pt. 4, at 502, cf. Maurizi, OccupationalLicensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL.
ECONOMY 339 (1974); Benham & Benham, supra note 43; Urban & Mancke, supra note 32;
Jordan, supra note 32; Plott, Occupational Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the Oklahoma
Dry Cleaners, 8 J. LAW & EcON. 195 (1965).
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they may degenerate into cosy clubs or cartels."6' Referring back to the
standard of optimal allocative efficiency, however, it is important to keep in
mind that government regulation may be at least as anti-competitive as selfregulation. Thus, the first consideration should be whether any regulation is
66
needed.
SROs act as quasi-public utilities, particularly in their operation of public
marketplaces. 67 This raises different issues from those relating to standards
of business conduct. Here SROs are competing against each other in seeking
to attract participants to their respective markets. Reconciling the role of
competing promoter with disinterested regulator is not easy. This incongruous
pairing of roles can only lead to confusion on the part of the regulated, not
to mention the SROs themselves.
F. The Dilemma
Should regulation in the financial markets always be direct? The tendency
of SROs to insulate a regulated industry would be avoided; a layer of
arguably redundant regulation would be removed and costs might be reduced;
full due process standards would avoid competitive and other abuses; and the
impact on competition could be monitored more closely and, hopefully,
ameliorated. Supporters of self-regulation will counter that SROs can better
provide detailed regulation, deal with ethics and morals, be more responsive,
eliminate regulatory tensions and foster participation by the regulated, as well
as that SROs are somehow inherently preferable as a means of social
control. 68 Empirical support for these contentions, however, is noticeably
absent. Even with day-to-day regulation of floor activities on stock exchanges, probably the most difficult area for the SEC to assume, experience
69
with the self-regulatory alternative makes one skeptical.
III. THE WORKINGS OF SELF-REGULATION
As noted earlier, self-regulation appears to have played a more important
role in the securities markets than in any other sector of the economy. 0 The
exchanges and the NASD 7I regulate their respective market facilities, pro65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

U.K. Warm PAPER, supra note 3, at 15; see also id. at 23-24.
Edwards, supra note 16, at 46.
See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 502.
See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (discussing myth of self-regulation).
See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes I & 2; Cary, supra note 3. "Self-regulation does not seem to have

played as major a role in the regulation of other financial institutions as it has in the securities
industry. The expansion of self-regulation into those areas raises issues as to whether new SROs
should be formed and, if so, what activities they would perform." SEC Self-Regulation Paper,
supra note 6, at 9. Except for the SEC, financial regulators generally have employed direct
oversight, although they rely to some extent on independent public accountants, an alternative
method of self-regulation.
71. Until recently broker-dealers that chose not to join the NASD were regulated directly
by the SEC through its SECO (SEC only) program, but 1983 amendments to the Exchange Act
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mulgate rules of conduct for their members and enforce those rules as well

as the securities laws. SRO rulemaking covers sales practices and ethical
norms, trading and other business practices, and financial and operational
responsibility. As described by the SEC, "[SROs] are responsible for establishing, reviewing with a view to assuming compliance, and enforcing standards of conduct. SRO's have been particularly important in the regulation
'
of ethical standards, business practices, and financial responsibility. ' 72
A.

The Statutory Scheme

While American stock exchanges have regulated members' conduct since
the Nineteenth Century, it was not until 1934 that the Exchange Act created
government-supervised self-regulation. 7 In considering this legislation, Con-

gress found exchange self-regulation wanting in important respects. 74 None-

theless, Congress believed that if buttressed with governmental oversight, the
benefits of self-regulation would outweigh any shortcomings.7 5
Then in 1938 Congress passed the Maloney Act, which provided for

associations of participant members to assume a regulatory role for the over76
the-counter market similar to that of the exchanges for their marketplaces.
In this role, the associations would be subject to more
intensive oversight by
77
the SEC than had been provided for the exchanges.
eliminated the SECO program and required membership in a national securities association for
all broker-dealers except those who execute securities transactions only on securities exchanges
to which they belong. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 20273 (1983).
72. SEC Self-Regulation Paper, supra note 6, at 1.
73. See Jennings, supra note 7, at 667-77 (describing evolution of self-regulatory system).
Speculation on and shortcomings of stock exchanges had been of recurring legislative concern
since early in the century. See generally 42 CONG. REc. 1347, 1349 (Jan. 31, 1908) (statement
of President Roosevelt); Regulation of the Stock Exchange, Hearings on S.3895 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); Tracy & MacChesney,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1025, 1033-36 (1934); White, The
Hughes Investigation, 17 J. POL. ECON. 528 (1909).
74. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1963).
75. See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 7820 Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1934); see also SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY,
supra note 12, at 137-43 (discussing congressional debate over utility of self-regulation); J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 73-100 (discussing evolution of self-regulation).
76. Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 719, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). See II L. Loss, supra
note 12, at 1362-63 (discussing New Deal antecedents of Maloney Act). The discovery of the
embezzlement by Richard Whitney, a member and former president of the New York Stock
Exchange, of securities belonging to customers as well as the Exchange's gratuity fund facilitated
enactment of this legislation. See J.SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 183-89. See F. PEcoRA, WAL
STREETiUNDER OATH 258-82, 287-89, 300-03 (1939) (florid description of abuses of and on
Exchange prior to enactment of Exchange Act).
77. Section 15A(b) of Exchange Act required the SEC to make more definitive findings
with respect to the functioning of securities associations before permitting registration than in
the case of the exchanges. Moreover, while exchanges only had to furnish the SEC with rule
amendments after their adoption, associations were required under §15A(g) to file such changes
with the SEC for review in advance of effectiveness. See SENATE INDUSTRY STUDy, supra note
12, at 145 (discussing amendments to self-regulatory scheme).
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The resulting bifurcated structure continued basically unchanged until
enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.21 Severe back-office

problems in the securities industry, 79 coupled with a perception that the
industry had not been responsive to changing economic and technological
conditions, 0 had led Congress to review the workings of self-regulation.,
Although Congress again recognized self-regulation as part of the scheme of
governance for the securities industry, it found fault both with the SROs
and with the SEC in its oversight function. Accordingly, in the 1975
amendments Congress imposed a much more comprehensive SEC oversight
role. These amendments were also supposed to remove impediments to
competitive, fair and orderly markets,82 and to facilitate a national market
system. 3 Moreover, Congress created a new SRO, the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (MSRB).84

78. Pub. L. No. 94-29 (1975).
79. See generally H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 44-45 (1975); J.

SELIGMAN,

supra note 19, at 450-66; H.

BARUCH, WALL STREET SECURITY RISK (1971).
80. 1975 SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53.
81. See N. WOLFSON, R. PnLws & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND
SECURITIES MARKETS
12.01 (1977).

82. These impediments were identified as: (a) fixing of brokerage commission rates, (b)
restrictions on access to markets and on market making, (c) opposition to integration of markets
by vested interests, (d) monopolistic control of the dissemination of market information, and
(e) the absence of effective control of market development operations by the SEC. 1975 SENATE
COM1TTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 1; see generally SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12.
83. Section 1lA of the amended Exchange Act directs the SEC to facilitate a national
market system and generally provides specifications for the system. Section 17A defines a system
for clearing and settling securities transactions. Sections 17A(c) and 11A(b) require registration
of, respectively, securities transfer agents and securities information processors.
Although the SROs have played a pivotal role in developing-or impeding, as the case
may be-the national market system, detailed treatment of this subject is outside the scope of
this article. See Suacomm. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM: FivE YEAR STATUS REPORT,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 96-IFC 56); Cohen, The National Market System-A
Modest Proposal,46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 743 (1978); Harman, The Evolution of the National
Market System-An Overview, 33 Bus. LAW. 2275 (1978), Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the
SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. IL. L. REv. 315 (1985); Melton,
CorporateEquities and the NationalMarket System, FRBNY QUAR. REv. 13 (Winter 1978-79);
Poser, Restructuring in Stock Markets: A CriticalLook at the SEC's National Market System,
56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 883 (1981); Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance; The National
Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1975); Werner, The SEC as a Market
Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755 (1984).
84. Exchange Act §15B(b). In creating the MSRB, Congress again chose self-regulation
over direct governmental regulation as the preferred means of comprehensive governance of
securities markets. SENATE COMMIrTE REPORT, supra note 53, at 46. See generally Dikeman,
Municipal SecuritiesRulemaking Board: A New Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VANrD. L. REv.
903 (1976); Wallison, Self-Regulation of the Municipal Securities Industry, 6 SeC. REG. L. J.
291 (1979); Comment, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and
Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1270-74. Prior to the 1975 amendments, municipal
securities dealers had long been successful in fending off this and other forms of regulation.
See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 19, at 187-88.
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The Exchange Act previously had required registration of SROs, thus
providing a measure of implicit control, but had not defined the authority
of national securities exchanges over their members. Congress amended
section 6 of the Exchange Act to extend the more definitive scheme applicable
to the NASD under section 15A of the Act to the exchanges. Under this new
scheme, the SEC was to judge applications for registration by SROs according
to the following standards:
1. The SRO must have the capacity to carry out the purposes
of the Exchange Act and must enforce compliance by its members
85
with the Act as well as the SRO's own rules.
2. The SRO must accept as members all persons meeting
relevant capital and competency requirements, 6 excepting only spec87
ified categories of persons.
3. Rules of the SRO must provide for fair representation of its
membership in the SRO's governance as well as one or more directors
who are representatives of issuers and investors."8
4. Fees, dues and other changes must be allocated equitably.8 9
5. Rules of the SRO must be designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative practices. 90
6. An SRO must enforce the Exchange Act and its own rules
and impose appropriate sanctions on violators. 9'
7. Rules must provide fair disciplinary procedures 92 and mini93
mum due process requirements.
85. Exchange Act §§6(b)(l) and 15A(b)(2); cf. U.K.

WHrrE PAPER,

supra note 3, at 14,

19.
86. Exchange Act §§6(b)(2) and 15A(b)(3). Nonetheless, a national securities exchange
may limit the number of members as well as those permitted to effect transactions on the floor
of the exchange. Exchange Act §6(c)(4). A registered securities association may not impose such
limitations. Exchange Act §15A(b)(3).
87. Id. §3(a)(39). Under §§6(c)(2) and 15A(g)(2) an SRO may refrain from banning such
statutorily disqualified persons, although it must give advance notice of such person's membership to the SEC who may then direct the SRO to ban the person if the SEC finds denial
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
88. Id. §§6(b)(3) and 15A(b)(4). Congress rejected an earlier version of this section that
would have provided the "public" directors with independent staff.
89. Id. §§ 6(b)(4) and 15A(b)(5).
90. Id. §§ 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6).
91. Id. §§ 6(b)(6) and 15A(b)(7). A registered securities association must also enforce
compliance with the rules of the MSRB. Id. §15A(b)(2).
92. Id. §§ 6(b)(7) and 15A(b)(8).
93. Id. §§ 6(d)(l) and 15A(h)(1).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:853

8. Rules must not impose any unnecessary burden on competi94
tion.
The 1975 Amendments thus added various safeguards to the rulemaking
processes of SROs. Although SROs had previously been required to file
proposed rule changes with the SEC, the amendments required an additional
statement of the basis and purpose of the rule and that interested parties be
afforded an opportunity to be heard. 95 The amendments also had the effect
of constraining the discretion of the SROs in determining policy outside the
rulemaking process. 96 Moreover, the SEC was given authority to amend any
SRO rule in order to make it consistent with the Exchange Act. 97 In addition,
Congress conferred on the SEC an array of powers under section 19(h) to

deal with SROs' failure to enforce their rules or the Exchange Act9" or to
comply themselves."

Congress further provided in 1975 for the elimination of regulatory
duplication. 100 When a person is a member of more than one SRO, the SEC
may relieve the SRO of some or all of its regulatory responsibility concerning
the member.' 0' The SEC may also allocate subject matter among SROs.' 0 2
In completing this brief overview of the federal scheme provided in the

Exchange Act for self-regulatory organizations, it should be mentioned that
state regulation consistent with the Exchange Act is not preempted. 03
B.

Impact of SROs on Their Members

SROs may affect the interests of their members in several ways. First,
SROs may take disciplinary action against their members; second, SROs may
deny membership; and third, SROs may require members to stop doing

business or particular transactions with non-members or a particular class 'of
94. Id. §§ 6(b)(8) and 15A(b)(9); cf. U.K. WrUTE PAPER supra note 3, at 14, 23-24.
95. Exchange Act § 19(b)(1). The SEC is required to publish notice of proposed rule
changes and comply generally with rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures
Act. 5 U.S.C. §553 (1971).
96. Exchange Act rule 19b-4, 17 C.F.R. §196-4 (1985); cf. NationalAss'n of Sec. Dealers,
17 S.E.C. 459 (1944).
97. Exchange Act § 19(c).
98. Congress believed that during the back-office crisis of the late 1960s, "some exchanges
refused to compel strict adherence to financial responsibility requirements, which action in some
cases permitted its [sic] member firms to continue in business in jeopardy to their customers."
H.R. RP. No. 123, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1975).
99. See, e.g., PhiladelphiaStock Exch., Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 16648 (1980).
100. Exchange Act § 17(d)(1); cf. §19(g)(2).
101. Exchange Act § 17(d)(1). These include, for example, responsibilities for examinations
and enforcement.
102. Id.; see Exchange Act rules 17d-1 and d-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17d-1-240.17d-2 (1984),
setting forth the guidelines for such allocation; cf. U.K. WnmE PAPER, supra note 3, at 15-16;
Coordination of Securities and Commodities Regulation, Securities Exch. Act Release No.
19706 (April 28, 1983).
103. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973); H.R.
REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975).
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non-members.10 An analysis of these possible responses by SROs indicates
that each may have serious competitive overtones.
C. DisciplinaryActions
The Exchange Act requires that national securities exchanges and asso-

05
ciations provide for enforcement of the Act and their own rules. Acts

subject to discipline also include conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade and acts detrimental to the interest or welfare of the
6
Sanctions include
SROs or reflecting adversely upon their reputation.'

censure, fine, limitation of activities, suspension and bar. 07
The SROs have enforcement staff who investigate misconduct. In addition, members are required to advise the SROs of certain matters that may
involve violation of these provisions. 08 SROs may require members and
associated persons to attend recorded interviews and respond to questions
under oath. 09 If these persons invoke the privilege against self-incrimination,

they may violate the SROs' rules." 0

SROs must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning

charges brought against affected persons."' Sections 6(d)(1) and 15A(h)(1)
of the Exchange Act set forth specific safeguards for disciplinary actions,
and sections 6(bX7) and 15A(bX8) superimpose a standard of "fair proceSTUDY, supra note 12, at 150.
105. Exchange Act §§6(b)(1) and 15A(b)(2). The latter provision also requires that members
of a national securities association be appropriately disciplined for violation of the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. 2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 337 (1944).
106. See, e.g., NYSE rule 476; ASE rule 345; NASD Rules of Fair Practice; Crimmins v.
American Stock Exchange, 368 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d
Cir. 1974) (registered representative presumed to possess knowledge of ethical standards of his
profession).
107. See, e.g., NYSE rule 476; ASE Constitution, art. V, §§ l(c) and 4; NASD By-Laws,
art. VII, §3.
108. See, e.g., NYSE rules 345 and 351.
109. NYSE rule 476(a)(1 1); RichardNewberger, NYSE Hearing Panel Decision 80-39 (July
11, 1980); ASE rule 341; NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. IV, §5.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Sloan, 388 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Lawrence H. Abercrombie, Securities Exch.
Act Rel. No. 16285 (Oct. 18, 1975). ASE Disciplinary rule 11 (b) prohibits legal objections to
the exchange's inquiries until there is a hearing on the matter under investigation. Denial of the
right against self-incrimination is based on the theory that membership in an SRO is a privilege
and that in return for such privilege, one commits to abide by certain rules. See Belton v.

104. See SENATE INDUSTRY

Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888); MEYER, LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK

ExctANas 37-46 (1931). A system of self-regulation would not be effective, the theory goes,
without the ability to compel self-incriminating testimony, which the member (or its associated
person) has agreed to provide in exchange for the privilege of membership.
111. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Crimmins v. American
Stock Exch., 368 F. Supp. 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F. 2d 560 (2d Cir. 1974); cf.
Intercontinental Industries v. American Stock Exch., 452 F. 2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (delisting proceeding).
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dure" for all such actions. 1 12 Discovery rights
for respondents in SRO
3
disciplinary proceeding, however, are limited."
4
Hearings are held before panels composed of members and staff."
Parties may be represented by counsel both before and at the hearings."'
Hearing panels are not bound by formal rules of evidence and base their
decisions on "businessmen's judgment." Although rules of the SROs do not
prescribe a standard of proof, the preponderance standard used by the SEC
in disciplinary proceedings involving charges of violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws and approved by the Supreme Court
6
in Steadman v. SEC" is probably applicable.' '7
Decisions of such panels may be reviewed by the SROs' boards." 8 Final
disciplinary action is subject to review by the SEC, either on its own motion
or on application of an aggrieved person." 9 The SEC may set aside or reduce
the sanction or it may remand the proceeding to the SRO; it may not increase
the sanction. Persons aggrieved by the SEC decisions may obtain review by
a United States Court of Appeals, which may affirm, modify or set aside
the SEC's order. 20
Several courts have found disciplinary actions of exchanges to be governmental in character and, therefore, subject to the requirements of due
process.' 2' Courts that have reviewed NASD actions, however, have reached

112. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. NASD, 616 F.2d 1363, 1371 (5th Cir.
1980).
113. Such respondents generally are not permitted to take prehearing depositions and are
not entitled to the prehearing production of documents. The NYSE and ASE rules do not
permit discovery of documents prepared in connection with proceedings, although the NYSE's
Department of Enforcement and the ASE's Compliance Department say that they will provide
voluntarily exculpatory evidence and statements of witnesses intended to be called.
114. NYSE Hearing Panels are chaired by employees of the exchange who are supposed to
be independent from the departments that issue the charges and the investigative and prosecutoral arms of the exchange. NYSE rule 476(b). At the ASE, the Director of Hearings, an
employee of the exchange, chooses panel members from the securities industry but does not sit
on such panels herself. Formal disciplinary proceedings of the NASD are held before hearing
panels that are usually subcommittees of District Business Conduct Committees and their
industry representatives.
115. See, e.g., ASE Constitution, art. V, sec. 1(a).
116. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
117. See In re Walter T. Newman, Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 18932 (Aug. 4, 1982);
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-6045.
118. See, e.g., NYSE rules 476(0 and (g); ASE rules 345(e) and (i); NASD Code of
Procedure §15(a).
119. See Exchange Act §§15A(h)(3), 19(d), 19(e), and rule 19d-2 thereunder. Prior to the
1975 amendments, the SEC could review only disciplinary actions of the NASD. 15 U.S.C.
§780-3(f) and (g) (1970) (amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)).
120. Exchange Act §25(a)(1).
121. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940-43 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972) (delisting proceeding requires minimum procedural
protections); Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(due process requirements apply to NYSE disciplinary hearings), aff'd sub. nom. Sloan v. New
York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973); Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp.
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opposite conclusions.' 22 Various attacks on the NASD's disciplinary authority
based on a theory of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by
Congress also have been unsuccessful. 2 3 It is curious that similar challenges
have not been made to the disciplinary authority of the exchanges, although
the SEC has asserted that the exchanges' disciplinary powers were not
24
conferred by Congress.
D.

SROs and Competition Among Members

Self-regulatory schemes are subject to the danger that "a group of
competitors agreeing to impose restrictions upon themselves ... will use its

power, intentionally or unintentionally, to limit competition or disadvantage
non-member competitors.... ,,'21 This peril is exacerbated by the comming-

ling of disciplinary and market-regulation functions, such as reallocation of
specialists' stocks by exchanges, as well as by the vagueness of SRO precepts

such as the "high standards of commercial honor" and "just and equitable
principles of trade.' '1

26

To illustrate, the Batten Committee, formed by the

NYSE to study its stock allocation system, recommended in a report in 1976
that the specialists' function as well as the criteria for allocation of stocks
be better defined. The committee pointed to the difficulty of proving

violations of the exchange's rules because of the vagueness of terms such as
"reasonable" and "good business practices." The competitive ramifications

of this process are considerable.
Indeed, competitive advantages are a significant attraction to SRO
membership.

27

For example, NASD members are prohibited from dealings

1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (minimum due process applies to exchange disciplinary proceeding,
though this does not automatically include right to counsel), aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1974).
122. United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (NASD is not
governmental actor); Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Tex. 1970)
(NASD is a governmental actor), rev'd on other grounds, 451 F. 2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971),
modified per curiam, 459 F. 2d 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972); see Comment,
Governmental Action and the National Association of Securities Dealers, 47 FoRtDHAi L. REv.
585 (1979); see also Westwood & Howard, supra note 1, at 529-30.
123. See, e.g., Sorrell v. SEC, 679 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982); First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Todd
& Co., Inc. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012 (3d Cir. 1977); R. H. Johnson & Co., v. SEC, 198
F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952).
124. In re Harold C. Allen, Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 14763 (May 16, 1978), aff'd
sub. nom. Allen v. SEC, 577 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978). Moreover, until the 1975 amendments
to the Exchange Act, exchange disciplinary actions were not appealable to the SEC.
125. SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 19; see generally Comment, Trade
Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 1486 (1966); MEYER, LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 60-64 (1931).
126. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; cf. Colonial Realty Co. v. Bache, 358
F.2d 178, 183 n.6 (2d Cir. 1966).
127. Comment, Over-the-Counter Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE L. J. 633, 64647 (1939); cf. Miller, supra note 8, at 102. The only alternative to economic benefits is
compulsory membership, which was the method authorized by Congress for organizations
created under § 17 of the CFTC Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 170.15 (1985) (mandatory membership
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with non-members except upon the same terms as the general public. 21 In
order to participate in most underwritings, broker-dealers must be members
of the NASD. 29 Moreover, since 1983, all broker-dealers engaged in the
over-the-counter securities business must belong to a national securities
association; 30 the only national securities association being the NASD.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,'3' the United States Supreme

Court dealt with an abuse of power by an SRO. Two broker-dealers who
were not members of the NYSE arranged with members for direct wire
connections to their corporate securities trading departments. The member
firms applied to and were granted temporary approval by the NYSE of the
wire connection. The NYSE also approved a direct teletype connection to a
member firm and a stock ticker service from the floor of the exchange.
Several months later, the NYSE disapproved and instructed its member firms
to discontinue these arrangements. No notice was given to the non-members
nor was any explanation furnished. An inhibited ability to obtain commissions and communicate with other firms, as well as the stigma attached to
the NYSE's disapproval, diminished the volume of business and profits of
the non-members. The non-members alleged that the NYSE and its members
had conspired to deprive the non-members of their wire connections and
stock ticker services in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Emphasizing the lack of procedural safeguards,' 3 2 the Court questioned
"whether the New York Stock Exchange is to be held liable to a non-member
broker-dealer under the anti-trust laws or regarded as impliedly immune
therefrom when, pursuant to rules the Exchange has adopted under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it orders a number of its members to
remove private direct telephone wire connections previously in operation
between their office and those of the non-member, without giving the nonmember notice, assigning him any reason for the action, or affording him
an opportunity to be heard." 133 The Court next proceeded "to reconcile
pursuit of the anti-trust aim of eliminating restraints on competition with
in registered futures associations by futures commission merchants); S. REP. No. 95-850, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978). Compulsory membership subsequently was adopted with respect to
national securities associations. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8).
128. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §25, NASD MANUAL D-13; see Comment,
Governmental Action and the NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REV.
585, 587 (1979).
129. See Westwood & Howard, supra note 1, at 527-28, 539 n. 118.
130. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8); Pub. L. No. 98-38 (1983); see Amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Report to Accompany H.R. 2681, No. 98-106, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1983).
131. 373 U.S. 341 (1983).
132. Id. at 358. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, the Court stated that had there
been "Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particular exchange
ruling, as there is under the 1938 Maloney Act amendments to the Exchange Act to examine
disciplinary action by a registered securities association ... a different case would arise
concerning exemption from laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity ..
" Id. at 358
n.12.
133. Id. at 358.
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the effective operation of a public policy contemplating that securities
exchanges will engage in self-regulation which may well have anti-competitive
effects in general and in specific applications."'13 4 It then accommodated the
NYSE's power under the Exchange Act "to adopt rules governing its
members' relations with non-members" with the anti-trust laws by enunciating the principle that repeal of the anti-trust laws would be "implied only
if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only
to the minimum extent necessary." '35
Applying this principle, the Court found that the lack of notice to a
non-member to explain why a rule was being invoked to damage him and of
an opportunity to refute the case against him was fatal to the validity of the
action taken by the NYSE.' 36 The Court said,
The point is not that the antitrust laws impose the requirement of
notice and a hearing here, but rather that, in acting without according
petitioners these safeguards in response to their request, the Exchange
had plainly exceeded the scope of its authority under the Securities
Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation and therefore has not even
reached the threshold of justification under the statute for what
would otherwise be an antitrust violation ....

[I]t is perfectly clear

that the Exchange can offer no justification under the Securities
Exchange Act for its collective action in denying petitioners the
private wire connections without notice and an opportunity for
hearing, and that the Exchange has therefore violated §1 of the
Sherman Act ....

37

While Silver represents an effective judicial response to an anti-competitive abuse of its power by an SRO, ferreting out such abuses can be difficult.
Anti-competitive measures may be mixed with and camouflaged by regulatory
purposes. 36 The long saga of institutional membership on the exchange
illustrates the obfuscation of anti-competitive purposes by regulatory trappings. It is not surprising that the exchanges and their members would
exclude heavy commission payors in order to protect the system of fixed
134. Id. at 349.
135. Id. at 357; see Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
136. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. at 361-67.
137. Id. at 364-65. In considering the 1975 amendments, Congress recognized the potential
conflict of judicial review of a determination by the SEC that the anticompetitive effects of an
SRO rule were outweighed by the rule's advancement of the purposes of the Exchange Act;
nonetheless, Congress chose to expand the scope of such review, expressing both its confidence
in the courts' ability to reconcile regulatory and competitive factors and its intent to monitor
that reconciliation. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1975). Legislative
consideration of anti-trust immunity of self-regulatory organizations is treated in Heckmann,
Antitrust Immunity, 8 REv. SEc. REG. 841 (1975); see Report, Antitrust Immunity Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 35 REcoRn oF N.Y.C.B.A. 233, 234-46 (1980) (discussing case law
dealing with conflict between antitrust laws and federal regulatory schemes).
138. See, e.g., In re Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270, 288-92 (1941).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:853

commission rates. That they got away with the practice for so long, however,
suggests the inherent deficiencies of self-regulatory systems.'3 9 That even
Congress was gulled in 1975 into continuing the institutional exclusion in
section 11(a) of the Exchange Act, albeit in attenuated form, is evidence of
the political impact of the keepers of the preserve.
Still another example of the ability of competitors to manipulate the
self-regulatory scheme to exclude competition is provided by the off-board
trading rules. Despite the long apparent anti-competitive effects of such
rules, 40 their removal has been gradual at best and important remnants of
these anti-competitive devices are still in effect.' 4'
E.

SROs as Competitors

In addition to affecting competition among their members, SROs compete against each other in developing new products and trading processes
and are dependent upon their members for business. The NYSE calls itself
a "customer-driven business organization' '1 42 and reports that "a growing
array of financial products have competed for a share of the over-all pool
of investable funds and commissions. And this has intensified the competition
... among the various markets in which either similar or entirely different
4a
products are traded."'
This competition is reflected in the controversy concerning trading of
options. 4 Until recently the SEC has not permitted multiple trading, that
is, the trading of a class of options in more than one market. Instead,
optionable securities were allocated among the exchanges by lottery.' 45 Upon
such allocation, options on these securities became an exclusive franchise.
For instance, the NYSE has been granted approval to trade stock options
but opposition by other SROs was withdrawn only after the NYSE agreed
46
not to compete through multiple trading of options.'
The SEC questioned whether the allocation system should be extended
to options on securities traded in the NASDAQ market. 47 In response, the
NASD contended the lottery system would result in the NASD receiving "an
insufficient number of underlying securities to justify the cost of developing
139. See N. WOLFSON, R. PmLL PS & T. Russo, supra note 81, at
12.07 (discussing
institutional membership).
140. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT ON RuLE 394, H.R. Serial No. 73e, House COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 6, at 3293, 3372 (1972); ef. In re Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C.
270 (1941).
141. See rule 19c-3 under the Exchange Act.
142. NYSE 1984 Annual Report 6.
143. NYSE 1983 Annual Report 23.
144. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 20853 (April 12, 1984); see also Securities Exch.
Act Rel. No. 16863 (May 30, 1980).
145. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 22026, sec. IV (May 8, 1985).
146. 17 SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) 291 (1985).
147. Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 20853 (April 12, 1984).
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options related automated systems. ' ' 48 Similarly the NASD opposed the
granting to exchanges of unlisted trading privileges in over-the-counter
securities. 49 The SEC concluded that multiple trading should be allowed for
options on stocks traded over-the-counter but not, at least for the time
being, those on exchange-listed stocks.' 50
Early in 1984, the SEC convened a meeting attended by officials of the
options exchanges and member firms, at which the exchanges agreed to a
six-month moratorium on introducing new products. While the proliferation
of new products has created confusion in the marketplace and accompanying
regulatory concern, the use of self-regulation under a governmental umbrella
to implement agreements not to compete, such as this moratorium on new
products, the moratorium on multiple trading and the allocation plan, clearly
restrain trade.'5 '
As another example of competition among the self-regulators, the primary exchanges, that is, the NYSE and the ASE, have fought aggressively
to keep trades on their floors despite the objectives of the national market
system. For instance, these exchanges have opposed a best-execution rule
that would interrupt the order routing systems of major securities firms that
generally funnel orders automatically to their floors.' 5 2 The NASD, on the
other hand, has sought greater access to this order flow through the Intermarket Trading System and has urged adoption of a best-execution rule.'1 3
Finally, the regional exchanges have argued vigorously against elements of a
national market system that they perceive would likely result in loss of order
flow to the higher-volume exchanges.
The multifaceted competition common in the self-regulatory area is also
illustrated by the current efforts of the primary exchanges to amend their
rules to permit diversified firms to operate specialist units on those exchanges.'1 4 These efforts generally have been supported by those firms with
broad distribution capability but have been opposed by the more traditional
investment banking houses lacking such capability. The latter firms fear
being put at a competitive disadvantage because of the ability of the
distribution firms to marshall order flow. The traditional investment banking
houses thus far have inhibited significant liberalization on the NYSE by
148. NASD, Notice to Members 84-27 (May 15, 1984).
149. See In re Unlisted Trading Privileges in Over-the-CounterSecurities, SEC File No.
57-37-84; 49 Fed. Reg. 46156 (Nov. 23, 1984) (notice).
150. See 17 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 647 (April 19, 1985).
151. See Comments of the United States Department of Justice, In re New York Stock
Exchange Trading of Listed Stock Options, SEC File No. SR-NYSE-84-3 (June 15, 1984); In
re Over-the-CounterTrading of StandardizedOptions on Over-the-CounterSecurities, SEC File
No. SR-NASD-80-10 (June 15, 1984).
152. See Lipton, supra note 26, at 557.
153. Id. at 560 n. 146.
154. Current rules of the exchanges do not expressly prohibit specialist activities for such
firms but effectively preclude them for those who also engage in widespread research and
investment banking activities. See, e.g., ASE rules 190 and 193, NYSE rule 98; Securities Exch.
Act Rel. No. 22396 (Sept. 11, 1985).
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successfully lobbying for a provision in the proposed rule that a firm acting
as a specialist in a particular issue could not act as managing underwriter of
such issue. The efforts of the traditional banking houses were less successful
at the ASE, which rejected similar requests for limitations and restrictions
on diversification.
In its review of self-regulation undertaken in the early 1970s, Congress
found that SROs were ill-suited to cope with competitive questions.' 55 This
finding should have come as no surprise. SROs like other business enterprises
seek expanded revenues and market share. Their officials naturally will
garner whatever government support can be mustered toward these objec56
tives. The antitrust umbrella is a tactical device in the competitive struggle.'
Moreover, the SROs are competing to some extent with their members.
Espousal of anti-internalization rules by the exchanges is a case in point.
Although their advocacy of such rules is couched in terms of concerns about
best execution of customers' orders and fragmentation of markets, the
exchanges are obviously aware of the volume that might be lost to their
larger members. 57 Thus, such concerns may disguise an effort to create new
artificial restraints against retail firms competing as market makers that are
inconsistent with the goals expressed by Congress in section 1 A(a)(1)(c) of
the Exchange Act of economically efficient execution of securities transactions, fair competition among brokers and dealers and the practicability of
brokers executing investors' orders in the best market.
Similarly, the off-board trading rules of exchanges prevent member
firms' execution of principal transactions in listed securities (or those admitted to unlisted trading privileges) other than on those exchanges.'58 Again,
such restrictions serve to limit competition among the exchanges and their
members as well as the NASD, and, therefore, augment the exchanges'
turnover. The advent of 24-hour trading is likely to intensify this competitive
tension.
Likewise the aggressive proliferation by the exchanges of new trading
vehicles serves to increase competitive tension. Like their members, the
exchanges are attempting to diversify their product base as well as to protect
their market share of existing products. They must grow and generate new
sources of revenue in order to maintain their respective market shares. The
advent of computer brokerage systems that channel orders directly to automated order-routing and execution systems also presents opportunities for

155.

SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY,

supra note 12, at 2, 3.

156. It is perhaps recognition of this potential for perversion of the governmental insulator
that has led to the expansion of the SEC's market regulatory role beyond oversight. See Lipton,
supra note 26, at 529-31; Moylan, The Place of Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 6
SEc. REG. L.J. 49, 53-58 (1978). But see Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L.
REV.

755 (1984).

157. See generally Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 16888 (June 11, 1980) [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,608; 17 C.F.R. § 140.19c-3 (1982).
158. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 390 (CCH) 2390 (1981).
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competitive challenges by exchanges against their members.5

9

Because of

their trading, communications and clearing and settlement facilities and their
collaborative relationship with the SEC and other government agencies, these
SROs enjoy structural advantages over their membership. The conflicts

engendered by a quasi-governmental body competing with its regulated stable
should be of great concern to congressional overseers.
F.

SROs as Public Utilities

The operation of marketplaces by SROs may place them in the role of
a public utility.' 60 Because of an interesting dichotomy of congressional
views, this characterization is more accurate with respect to commodity
exchanges. 6' In the commodity context, a multiplicity of exchanges generally

has been believed to undermine the objective of bringing all participants
together to create optimum market conditions. 6 2 Multiple securities markets,
on the other hand, are a governmental objective.' 63 Nonetheless, individual
securities markets would seem to require collective activity in a manner
comparable to that of a utility. 64 Indeed the Special Study stated that "it
regulation should be no less
would seem that the contents and procedures of
65

effective than those for other public utilities."'
G. Oversight

James Landis pointed out that "the mere proscription of abuses was

insufficient to effect the realization of the broad objectives that lay behind
the movement for securities legislation. The primary emphasis of administrative activity had to center upon the guidance and supervision of the industry
as a whole."' 66 When non-governmental bodies act as surrogates of governmental powers, the "function of public oversight becomes critical."' 6 7 Public
oversight must assure that the delegation of power is effective in carrying
159. See Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21383 (Oct. 9, 1984).
160. SPECIAL STrUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 701; H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1934).

161. See Comment, Trade Associations Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for
the Role of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. Rv. 1486, 1492-93 (1966).
162. Id. at 1493; Selig, Steinmayer & Broida, Regulation of Commodity Market Traders,
18 REv. SEC. & COMMODrrnis RaO. 1-2 (1985).
163. Exchange Act §1lA(a)(1)(eXii). Multiple markets do occur in the case of some
agricultural commodities, such as wheat, and have become common for financial futures.
164. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
165. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 701.
166. J.LADs, supra note 14, at 15 (1938).

167. Id. at 697-98. "The governmental power may be delegated to greater or lesser degree,
but governmental authority is held in reserve to assure that each regulatory need is met fully
and effectively." Id. at 698; see SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 137. As George

Washington observed in a letter to John Jay on August 1, 1786: "Experience has taught us,
that men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the best calculated for their own
good, without the intervention of a coercive power." While SROs were not extant at the time,
this observation might well be applied to such groups.
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out the regulatory functions and that this power is not used to injure the
public or discriminate against private interests. 68 On the other hand, excessive
oversight can preempt the self-regulatory process. 69 The Special Study observed,
A non-governmental agency having responsibility to carry out public
regulatory objectives cannot be expected to exercise the full measure
of responsibility if the Commission is looking over its shoulder and
directing or second-guessing each individual action that it takes.
Furthermore, the existence of the power of oversight, and the risk
that in the exercise of that power its own standing and prestige may
be tarnished by having its performance called into question, provides

168. J. LANDIS, supra note 14, at 697. SROs are not authorized to act independent of SEC
oversight. H.R. RPP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48.
169. Letter from Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC, to James H. Scheuer,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, at 2 (April 15,
1980). The SEC Chairman added that
Effective self-regulation also requires that the relationship between the Commission
and the industry reflect the unique and difficult role of the SROs. A stock exchange
or other self-regulatory organization is expected to perform what are sometimes two
mutually inconsistent roles. As a marketplace, it competes for business and depends
upon the support of its members for economic survival, while at the same time
regulating the conduct of those members. Obviously, there are times when the selfregulators may have difficulty in balancing the interests of their members against
their duties and responsibilities under the 1934 Act. It is the Commission's responsibility in performing its oversight role to ensure that each self-regulator is indeed
striking that balance appropriately.
Id. In discussing the Market Oversight Surveillance System (MOSS) proposed by the SEC,
Chairman Williams provided an example of Orwelian newspeak:
At the bottom, the objections to MOSS are predicated chiefly on the assumption that
it will somehow duplicate or supplant existing SRO surveillance. On the contrary,
however, although MOSS will enhance the Commission's capability to oversee the
surveillance efforts of the SROs, the proposed system is not "redundant" of the
existing SRO surveillance systems. While MOSS will process the same raw data as do
the SROs, some on a daily basis, and some on a delayed basis, this information will
be used for a different purpose. The Commission's objective is to ensure, on an
exception basis, that the SROs routinely perform their statutory duties. The use of
the underlying data for direct regulatory purposes, such as through disciplinary and
other proceedings against SRO members, is largely the province of the SROs themselves.
Id. at 6.

The SEC intended MOSS to serve five primary functions:
i. To monitor trading in securities markets on an exception basis;
ii. To perform market reconstructions permitting review of historical trading;
iii. To provide inspection support information for SEC investigations;
iv. To assist in coordinating SRO and SEC investigations; and
v. To assist the SEC in determining the economic impact of existing or proposed
rule.
See HOUSING

AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE Comm. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE REGARD-

ING IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE

BANKING

MOSS,

SECOND SIX-MONTH REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON

(Oct. 1, 1981); S. REP. No. 96-752, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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strong compulsion for the assumption and proper discharge of the
self-regulatory functions. Thus, the very nature of the self-regulatory
role points, at the same time, to the need for autonomy and70the
sufficiency of thorough oversight and broad powers in reserve.
This suggests a fine balancing between restraint and action. In practice,
however, the Commission has appeared to vacillate between near abdication
and blanket second-guessing of SRO determinations.
The Senate Industry Study found shortcomings in oversight that had
"not by and large been the result of the SEC's lack of authority but rather
of its apparent lack of the will to use [its] powers."'' 7' Earlier, the Special
Study acknowledged that the Commission had been less than successful "in
the exercise of its powers and responsibilities to regulate conduct in the
securities markets, directly or by supervision of self-regulation."1172
The Reagan Administration's SEC Transition Team, on the other hand,
asserted that oversight activities had been carried out "at a level which is
both unnecessary and highly undesirable."'' 7 The Transition Team criticized
SEC concentration on "insignificant detail," saying that the SEC staff was
"often ill-trained and poorly equipped to evaluate in a meaningful way the
programatic activities of these self-regulatory organizations. They concentrate
on the insignificant and the trivial and cause needless expenditures of
government funds and self-regulatory organization funds in pursuing issues
which have little relevance or importance to investor protection."'7
The SEC's own view of its oversight role is set out in the SEC Paper on
Self-Regulation:
The Commission engages in a number of SRO oversight activities.
It approves SRO rules and reviews disciplinary actions. In addition,
its staff conducts regular examinations of SRO's to ensure that they
are complying wvith their responsibilities under the Exchange Act.
The staff focuses particularly on whether the SRO's inspection and
enforcement programs are adequate to assure compliance by their
members. Where staff identifies deficiencies, it directs the SRO to
take corrective action and inspects to see that corrective action is
taken.'7
The evolution of SROs from industry-dominated institutions to quasipublic bodies may lessen somewhat the need for governmental oversight. For
example, the increasing role of public governors 7 6 serves as a check to
170. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 703.

171. SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 180; see Report by the Comptroller
General, supra note 24, at 6, 7, 12; Jennings, supra note 7, at 664-67.
172. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 719 (emphasis added).
173. SEC Transition Team, Final Report 11-4 (Dec. 22, 1980).
174. Id. at 11-5.
175. SEC Self-Regulation Paper, supra note 6, at 7.
176. See 1975 SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 24, 273; H.R. REP. No. 123,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. at 60-61 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 98 (1975).
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industry domination.'" Because of the episodic nature of their role, however,
public governors have limited influence and may sometimes be co-opted by
member interests. In any event, SROs are funded by and most closely
involved with their members. Effective oversight is an essential countervailing
force.
H. Disclosure of Self-Regulatory Actions
Section 19(d) of the Exchange Act requires SROs to file all quasiadjudicatory decisions with the SEC for review. Congress has previously
indicated its concern that the absence of public scrutiny damaged public
confidence. 178
Although industry groups have generally been adverse to disclosure of

SRO disciplinary actions, Congress and regulatory agencies have favored
such disclosure,

79

and the SROs have followed along.' s0
CONCLUSION

The history of self-regulation in the securities markets suggests consid-

eration of whether the device is an adequate alternative to direct governmental
regulation-and in certain instances whether regulation is even needed. Before
the Exchange Act, the securities exchanges acquiesced in brazen manipulation, overreaching and self-dealing. Afterwards,
it was self-regulation that gave us such things as fixed commissions
and a baroque system of reciprocal commission practices for
years .... Likewise, restrictions on corporate membership and public and foreign ownership of member firms on exchanges hardly
stand as shining accomplishments of self-regulation. The same could
net capital problems of the
be said about the back-office crisis and
8
late 1960's, and a few other things.' '

177. See Chicago Board Opinions Exchange, Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 21439 (Oct. 31,
1984) (discussing influence of public governors).
178. See H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 26 (1975).
179. SENATE INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 14, 152-53; SEC, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices 60-61 (June 1, 1972); Securities Exch. Act

Rel. No. 10152 (May 17, 1973); SPEciAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 577. Even Bank
regulators have reconsidered their traditionally reticent disclosure policies. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Deposit Insurance in a ChangingEnvironment IV 11-12, 15-16 (1983).
180. See, e.g., American Stock Exchange Rules of Procedure in Disciplinary Matters, Rule
12. On the other hand, the NYSE recently has contended in its submission of a proposed rule
to impose fines for uncontested minor violations of the SRO's rules that it does not intend to
publicize such violations since it "believes that publicity would itself constitute a penalty that
would be disproportionate to the minor rule violation." File No. SR-NYSE-84-27; Securities
Exch. Act Rel. No. 21327 (1984).
181. Remarks of SEC Commissioner James Treadway,Jr. to the American Law InstituteAmerican Bar Association Conference on Broker-Dealer Regulation (Jan. 12, 1984).
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Given the current competitive stresses occurring among SROs as they
seek to preserve and expand their market share, there is little reason to
expect they will perform more admirably in the future. The ability of SROs
to impinge on the livelihood of their members and to establish anti-competitive restraints suggests at least that self-regulation should be carefully
circumscribed and monitored.
Moreover, the increasing overlap and confusion of financial services
across traditional categories of providers suggests issues that should be
addressed by agencies other than bands of competitors formed along lines
demarcated by Congress in the 1930s and, at least in part, archaic. The
"growing diversification of securities firms into non-securities activities [does]
not dictate that the jurisdiction of the self-regulatory organizations should
thereby be automatically extended....
One solution might be to redesign the regulatory structure to limit the
SROs' purview to market facilities. SROs would seem to be best able to deal
with the problems of their marketplaces, but even here they have only
18 3
performed competently when forced to do so by governmental overseers.
The SEC might also designate a market czar whose province would be the
overall market system. The SEC could give this market overseer the authority
to relieve any self-regulatory organization of the power to regulate certain
members or participants.'14 While such a system would not eliminate the
competitive conflicts among SRO marketplaces, these conflicts could be
resolved more directly by recognizing the SROs as public utilities and
regulating them as such. It is tempting to suggest that the ideal reform would
eliminate all, quasi-governmental roles of the SROs and permit them to
survive or perish by the vicissitudes of the marketplace to which they pay
obeisance; however, this suggestion is restrained by the difficulty of distinguishing between market operation and market regulation. The overlap of
such functions may be inevitable in a system such as that contemplated by
the Exchange Act.

182. Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 12994 (Nov. 18, 1976); see 1975 SENATE COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 53, at 28, 133. Sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6) of the Exchange Act limit
their grants of rulemaking authority to exchanges and securities associations to matters related
to the purposes of the Exchange Act or the administration of the SRO. Thus, SRO jurisdiction
is not co-extensive with the diversified ambit of securities firms. See 1975 SENATE COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 53, at 47.
183. See Jennings, supra note 7, at 672-74. Concerns about the adequacy of self-regulatory
processes in dealing with assorted market abuses, including those taking place on exchanges,
forced a moratorium on new options programs and expanding existing programs from 1977 to
1980 (BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CFTC AND SEC, A STUDY OF
THE EFFEcTs ON THE EcONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS 111-31, 32 (1984)) while
the SEC undertook a comprehensive review of options trading. SEC REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETs, H.R. REP. No. IFC-3, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1978).
184. Securities Exch. Act §17(d)(l); see 1975 SENATE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 53,

at 33; N. WOLFSON, R. PmILLIS, T. Russo, supra note 81, at 774.
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As an alternative, David A. Lipton has advanced a theory by which
regulatory responsibilities would be allocated between the SEC and the
SROs.' s5 Professor Lipton has outlined two factors of efficiency,
(i) the institutional resources that must be expended by the regulatory
body in order to obtain a satisfactory resolution of any particular
regulatory issue, and (ii) the likelihood that the institution can make
its decision free from the influence of conflicting interests that might
problem from being in
prevent the particular resolution of a specific
6
the best interests of the trading market.'1
Applying the first factor involves determining particular expertise, need for
uniformity and duplicating efforts.1 87 Where conflicts of interest are present,
Professor Lipton assumes generally the "greater inherent regulatory utility"
of the SEC since it is "an independent, bi-partisan government regulatory
agency designed to be relatively insulated from the political process."' 88
Accordingly, he suggests the following guidelines:
1.Decisions requiring technical expertise should be resolved by the
regulatory institution with the greatest expertise....
2. Decisions involving conflicts of interest ... should be resolved
by the regulatory institution not involved in the conflict....
3. Decisions requiring uniformity of approach for different SROs
should be administered by the SEC....
4. Decisions requiring diversity. . based upon differences in market
structure should be administered by the individual SRO ....
5. The Commission should resolve a problem when it has ultimate
regulatory authority over a regulatory authority issue and has
already decided upon a specific resolution for which it needs no
further technical assistance.' 89
The guidelines result from a thoughtful analysis of how decisions are
best made, given the existing self-regulatory scheme. As such, they should
assist decision-makers involved in these regulatory processes.' 9° Their application should help resolve the problems of cooperative regulation. Nonetheless, rigid application of the guidelines might leave the SROs with a severely
circumscribed field of authority. The second criteria of lack of conflict alone
would preempt a significant area of SRO jurisdiction. Under the statutory
dictates of a national market system, very few issues would fall into the
diversity-required criteria; most would require some uniformity and thus fall
185. Lipton, supra note 26.
186. Id. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted).
187. Id. at 544.
188. Id. at 544-45.

189. Id. at 545-47 (footnotes omitted).
190. In his conclusion, Professor Lipton suggests that similar guidelines might be used "to
resolve whether an industry should regulate itself at all or be regulated by the government."
Id. at 572.
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to the SEC under the third guideline. The first guideline is likely to be
established in particular cases by application of the guidelines in previous
situations. The final guideline reflects that self-regulation takes place at the
sufferance of the SEC. 191 Thus, the guidelines suggest a secondary, limited
role for self-regulation. Perhaps this is as it should be.

191. Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755 (1984).

